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Abstract. Call a belief ‘non-negotiable’ if one cannot abandon the belief without 
the abandonment of one’s religious (or non-religious) perspective. Although 
non-negotiable beliefs can logically exclude other perspectives, a non-reductive 
approach to religious pluralism can help to create a space within which the non-
negotiable beliefs of others that contradict one’s own non-negotiable beliefs can 
be appreciated and understood as playing a justificatory role for the other. The 
appreciation of these beliefs through cognitive resonance plays a crucial role to 
enable the understanding of those who hold other perspectives. epistemological 
and spiritual consequences of this claim are explored.
INTroDuCTIoN: NoN-reDuCTIVe relIGIous PlurAlIsm
In the philosophy of religion, the phrase ‘religious pluralism’ is used with 
a number of definitions that differ both in content and in precision. Just 
for starters, one may distinguish the following types of religious pluralism: 
soteriological, normative, epistemological, alethic, and deontological.1 
In each case, there is some value, respectively: salvation, recognition, 
knowledge, truth, the fulfilment of religious duties, which are considered 
by the pluralist to be available to the adherents of a plurality of religious 
beliefs. Then there are questions about how wide the plurality of religious 
beliefs to which these values are accorded is taken to extend. There is also 
a difference between degree pluralisms and equality pluralisms. equality 
pluralists claim that all the adherents of any of the faiths included in 
1 see legenhausen (2005); (2006); (2009).
24 HAJJ muHAmmAD leGeNHAuseN
the plurality of denominations over which a type of pluralism is defined 
are equal with regard to the value that defines that type of pluralism. 
Finally, we come to the difference between reductive and non-reductive 
pluralisms. reductive pluralists claim that there are some common 
factors among a plurality of religions by virtue of which these religions 
have the value that defines a type of pluralism. Non-reductive pluralists, 
to the contrary, claim that the factors that give some value to different 
traditions may differ from one another.
over the course of some years, I  have defended a  form of non-
reductive soteriological religious pluralism,2 a view inspired by the work 
of the shi‘ite scholar and martyr murtađā mutahharī.3 The defence has 
been both philosophical and theological. Philosophically, there are two 
arguments, one moral and one based on the implausibility of exclusivist 
claims. The moral argument is that it is wrong to hold that those outside 
one’s own denomination are bound for eternal damnation because this 
sort of belief violates moral norms. Norms that favour the recognition 
of the value of different traditions can also support the claim that what 
is distinctively valuable in each tradition deserves recognition. The 
other argument is that the exclusivist belief lacks credibility if it holds 
that there is a  God who is omnibenevolent and omnipotent, but who 
condemns to perdition those who through no fault of their own do 
not belong to one’s denomination. Furthermore, it may be argued that 
it is similarly implausible to believe that there is an omnibenevolent 
omnipotent God who does not recognize the distinctive merits found in 
different traditions. This argument is related to the theological argument, 
based on the assumption of principles of Islamic theology, that God is 
merciful and does what He wills, from which we may conclude that God 
would not punish people for beliefs for which they are not culpable, and 
furthermore, that He could guide different groups of people by what is 
specific to them, even when such specifics cannot all be combined in 
a consistent way, and even if we hold that the alternatives to Islam through 
which He may guide people are in various ways inferior to Islam. The 
trope of the spiritual path might be adapted to suggest that even those 
on what we consider to be the wrong path may be guided by markers 
specific to that path to prevent them from certain kinds of catastrophes. 
2 This was begun in a series of articles culminating in legenhausen (1999); and the 
most recent publication in defence of this view is legenhausen (2013).
3 mutahharī (1978: 352 ff.). (Note that standard diacritical marks for Arabic and 
Persian words have been altered to facilitate typesetting.)
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Philosophically, it may be argued that we should not confine our notion 
of divine guidance to that which is available only within the confines 
of a given denomination; and theologically, muslims should recognize 
such possibilities of divine guidance, and may consistently do so without 
compromising claims about the finality and universality of the mission 
of the Prophet muhammad (ﺹ).4
In what follows, I  will consider how to view some epistemological 
issues concerning religious belief from the perspective of a non-reductive 
religious pluralism.
NoN-reDuCTIVe relIGIous ePIsTemoloGY: JusTIFICATIoN
Any epistemic value (such as knowledge, certainty, reliability) can be 
used to generate a  form of epistemic religious pluralism according to 
which the value is to be found across denominational boundaries. I will 
defend the plausibility of versions of non-reductive epistemic pluralism 
with regard to epistemic justification, trust, and understanding. most 
important is understanding, because it affords a kind of passage across 
conflicting beliefs through which we can appreciate how beliefs we do 
not accept function in the doxastic practices of others. my thesis with 
regard to justification is only that there are some appropriate senses of 
epistemic justification with respect to which epistemic peers5 may belong 
to different denominations, hold contradictory non-negotiable beliefs, 
and may be justified in holding these beliefs, despite mutual recognition 
and availability of evidence. With regard to epistemic trust, I will argue 
that there are kinds of epistemic trust that we can have in others with 
whom we have fundamental disagreements.
sextus empiricus (c. 160-210) wrote: ‘Different people have different 
and discordant beliefs about the gods, so that neither are all of them to 
be trusted, because of their inconsistency, nor some of them, because 
of their equipollence (ἰσοσθένεια, isostheneia).’6 There are several 
points in this passage that are relevant to contemporary philosophical 
controversies about religious disagreement: first, contrary to sextus, 
4 A salutation upon the Prophet muhammad and his progeny is abbreviated with the 
Arabic letter: ﺹ.
5 In what follows, I will say that s1 and s2 are epistemic peers when neither is significantly 
inferior to the other with regard to the proper functioning of cognitive faculties and 
epistemic virtues, including general intelligence, conscientiousness, and logical acumen. 
see Gelfert (2011).
6 Adv. Math. bk. IX, 192, cited in rescher (1985: 224, n. 6).
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some have claimed that the inconsistency among religious views is only 
apparent;7 second, some claim, like sextus, that the opposition among 
views leads them to cancel one another out (isostheneia), while others 
deny this;8 and third, there is the issue of trust, whether the parties to 
sustained disagreement are worthy of trust.9 
In order to elucidate a  non-reductivist position on religious 
disagreement, it will be instructive to contrast it with the views of Peter 
van Inwagen.10 First, van Inwagen thinks that I am within my ‘ethico-
epistemic’ rights to base my beliefs on incommunicable insights and 
experience, and to believe that such incommunicables can give one 
an epistemic edge in philosophical disagreements. It is part of van 
Inwagen’s argument to allow for rational disagreement based on the idea 
that disputing peers use up their communicable reasons by a  mutual 
disclosure of information, and then differ by the incommunicable part 
that is left over. It is more likely that they disagree on the evaluation 
of many pieces of evidence and inferences drawn from them, and 
that attempts to get to the bottom of these disagreements will only 
reveal further disagreements. Through the process of dialogue and 
disagreement, there can occur a modification of positions, even when 
neither side is willing to consider giving up non-negotiable beliefs. 
If s1 and s2 disagree about some set of doctrines, Δ, such that their 
positions on the truth values of the elements of Δ are non-negotiable, 
then although s1 and s2 will not change their truth value assignments 
to the members of Δ after dialogue, they may come to reinterpret some 
of those elements, and to revise supporting beliefs that fall outside of 
Δ.11 Giving reasons for our beliefs is not a simple matter of displaying 
the evidence we have. When we give reasons we construct complex 
arguments in support of our positions, and in doing so we reflect upon 
and revise our views of whatever evidence becomes available, including 
our understanding of why others disagree.
second, religious beliefs are a complex mix of beliefs about what ought 
to be done, beliefs about the supernatural, and beliefs about how these 
various kinds of beliefs and religious practices relate to a  community, 
7 see Hick (1989) and Nasr (1985). I criticize these views in legenhausen (1999).
08 see Feldman and Warfield (2010), and Jäger and löffler (2011) and (2012).
09 see Foley (2001) and Zagzebski (2012).
10 see van Inwagen (1996).
11 For a theory of theological reasoning that draws on the notion of a research program 
as developed by Imre lakatos, see murphy (1990) and in Persian, Nasiri (2003).
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and how they serve to put one in relation to God. It is not credible to 
expect reasonable decisions about what one ought to believe in such 
matters to be made simply by examination of the implications of some 
body of evidence, even if the evidence base is expanded to include 
incommunicable insights. religious systems of belief, like general political 
outlooks and comprehensive philosophical views include practical as 
well as theoretical dimensions, each of which is multifaceted. such beliefs 
are justified when they form an integrated worldview that enables one to 
arrive at explanations and decisions and serve as a framework in which 
to gain further insight and understanding.12 Judging the overall merits of 
such systems of belief, outlooks, and views can be carried out rather well 
in different ways, resulting in inconsistencies among the beliefs that are 
incorporated in different systems.
Third, van Inwagen frames the problem of persistent disagreement 
as one between two individuals who draw conclusions from shared 
evidence plus incommunicable insights. However, epistemic attitudes 
are not justified by inference alone, but through the process of defending 
one’s positions and arguing against alternatives. one does not engage 
in this process alone. Positions are defended by a large group of people 
who investigate, research, and make judgments. It may be appropriate 
for me to take a  stand on an issue, with epistemic justification, even 
though I admit lack of expertise, on the basis of what I have been able to 
understand, and the trust I have in the work of others.
In sum, I  believe that the idea that the proponents of opposing 
sides of controversial issues can always just sit down and disclose their 
evidence to one another to reach agreement is a kind of philosophical 
fantasy. of course, in some fairly straightforward cases an examination 
of the evidence might suffice to bring about consensus among those 
who are rational; but in more complex cases of disagreements in such 
areas as religion, philosophy, economics, and politics, the way in which 
one reasons about an issue according to a  generally reliable doxastic 
practice may justify taking a stance other than suspension (or revision) 
of belief – even though there are others who are at least one’s peers and 
who disagree.13
When faced with disagreement, even persistent disagreement, one 
often looks for more reasons. reasons are not used up when evidence 
12 see löffler (2006), ch. 5, and muck (1999: 101-105).
13 see oppy (2010: 197-198).
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is shared. When faced with disputes in the humanities and the natural 
sciences, we rationally respond to disagreements by trying to find 
errors and merits, stronger and weaker lines of argumentation, and by 
reformulating our positions. sometimes this work leads to a dead end, 
not only personally, but for the bulk of those engaged in what lakatos 
called a  ‘research programme’.14 Then the program is abandoned, and 
belief is suspended until another program is found that seems promising 
and for which there is good reason to think it will be successful. but 
as long as the program is advancing, one may have reason to trust its 
assumptions, even in the face of stiff competition.
What justifies one’s beliefs is not just a  body of evidence, but also 
what William Alston has described as good doxastic practice.15 When 
one forms beliefs in accordance with a generally reliable policy, one is 
justified in holding those beliefs. There is no unique doxastic practice 
that is recognized as being most reliable. opposing parties might adhere 
to doxastic practices that are equally reliable (or which appear to each 
of them to be most reliable), but which result in the acceptance of 
beliefs by the parties that cannot be conjoined without contradiction. 
When we discover that another party is following a  reliable practice 
that yields results that contradict our own, suspension of belief might 
have disastrous consequences to one’s doxastic practice, for since overall 
reliability is a matter of having a significant proportion of true beliefs as 
well as the avoidance of error, the policy of suspending belief when faced 
with peer disagreement might result in a policy that lacks coherence, or 
that forces us to suppress our natural desire for truth.16
An epistemic non-reductive pluralist with regard to the justification 
of religious belief will hold: first, that there may be epistemic peers with 
contradictory religious beliefs; second, that the reasons that justify the 
different beliefs will differ, and even the standards of rationality to which 
appeal is made in the justification of these beliefs may differ;17 and, third, 
that it may be rational to remain steadfast in one’s beliefs despite the 
recognition of persistent peer disagreement.18 To elaborate this position 
further, we need to consider the issue of trust.
14 see lakatos (1970). For related discussion see D’Costa (1993) and enoch 
(2010: 963).
15 see Alston (1991), ch. 4.
16 see Zagzebski (2012: 45); and lam (2011).
17 see macIntyre (1988) and D’Costa (1993).
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NoN-reDuCTIVe relIGIous ePIsTemoloGY: TrusT18
At the midpoint of his drama of ideas of 1779, Nathan the Wise (Nathan 
der Weise), Gotthold ephraim lessing presents a  discussion about 
religion between the sultan, saladin (Arabic: Śalāħ al-Dīn), and a Jewish 
merchant, Nathan. The sultan asks Nathan how to find the truth about 
religion. Nathan responds with the famous story of the three rings from 
the Decameron. In the course of telling the story, the sultan becomes 
impatient, and Nathan responds that conflicting religious beliefs are due 
to different beliefs about history.
Do not all [the religions] ground themselves in history? 
Written or transmitted! And 
history must indeed be accepted solely on trust 
and faith? – No? – 
Now, in whom do we place our trust and faith 
with the least doubt? surely, in our own people? 
Those of whose blood we are?19
I  think that there is something profound in lessing’s reflections, but 
also something wrong. What is profound is the role that trust plays 
in religious belief, especially with regard to the acceptance of sacred 
history. Furthermore, and most urgently for our discussion, with regard 
to many areas of concern to us, we do not find that those with whom 
we share blood ties are the least dubious in their opinions. In politics 
we trust the opinions found in our party more than those of our own 
fathers and mothers. A  non-reductive pluralism about the value of 
trustworthiness, would emphasize the fact that we often have reason 
to trust others because of features that are peculiar to them. Indeed, 
in the normal everyday cases in which we put our trust in others, it is 
because they have an ability or some knowledge we lack. likewise, it 
may be that my self-trust with regard to religious beliefs is not based 
on trust in the general faculties common to all humanity, but on the 
particular doxastic practices that I employ in this area. There need be no 
epistemic presumption in favour of the veridicality of the deliverances 
of the faculties of other persons on religion, given that they employ 
very different kinds of doxastic practices, even if in other areas they are 
18 see macIntyre (2009), who argues that a  position may be rationally vindicated 
although intelligent people opposed to the position may remain steadfast in their 
opposition.
19 lessing (1779: 132).
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judged to be epistemic peers. The similarity of the general faculties in 
the self and others may not be sufficient for other’s beliefs to yield even 
a prima facie reason for accepting the other’s belief, unless there is reason 
to think that we are utilizing the same doxastic practices.20
Knowing that an astrologer is extremely conscientious in calculating 
the positions of the planets, and is careful to draw appropriate inferences 
according to astrological principles will not increase my trust in the 
predictions of the astrologer, even if the astrologer displays cognitive 
virtues that (in part) provide me with reason to trust myself. Hence, the 
cognitive virtues alone do not provide a sufficient ground for trust, but 
must be coupled with other factors, such as the rejection of principles 
that are not tenable in the light of modern science or other central 
elements to one’s worldview.
In linda Zagzebski’s treatment of issues related to epistemic authority 
and trust, she also concludes that people might have reason to trust 
in the doctrines of their own community rather than in the beliefs of 
conscientious people of another community on issues over which the 
communities have differing teachings. Zagzebski takes this to stem from 
the fact that a person may have reason to trust the community to which 
they belong more than that of the other person.21 This brings us back to 
the point made by Nathan in lessing’s drama.
Zagzebski contends that when different communities can find shared 
beliefs, this can serve as a basis for trust between communities.22 Here 
we need to distinguish between trusting in a community because we are 
epistemically justified in thinking that they have true beliefs and trusting 
in a community for practical reasons, e.g., because the community will 
provide a  good social environment for us. The fact that a  community 
provides a  healthy social environment for its members due to human 
experiences, moral qualities, and background beliefs that are shared 
with my community does not give me reason to trust that the other 
community would provide a good social environment for me. so, similar 
practical goals can be used to justify conflicting allegiances. likewise, 
even if epistemic virtues and powers are exhibited by two communities 
equally, I may have reason to believe that one community’s beliefs are 
true on matters over which they disagree. Trusting in the virtues and 
20 see Zagzebski (2012: 214).
21 see Zagzebski (2012: 221-228).
22 Zagzebski (2012: 222).
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talents of one side in a dispute when the virtues and talents are displayed 
on the other side as well may be practically justified, but it will not 
necessarily provide epistemic justification or practical justification for 
accepting a belief. For epistemic justification, there is no other recourse 
but to engage in the practice of examining the reasons that can be offered 
in support of one’s beliefs. but the recognition of intellectual honesty 
and ability in another community may provide epistemic justification 
for yet another kind of epistemic trust: trust that the other community 
will conscientiously employ its own doxastic practices. We may thus 
find (at least) three ways in which a community may be trusted: (1) one 
may trust a community to come up with true beliefs; (2) one may trust 
a community in some practical affairs, e.g., to issue honest statements, to 
provide a secure social environment for its members, to negotiate fairly; 
(3) one may trust a community to employ its own doxastic practices in 
a  reflectively conscientious manner. Trusting a  community in any of 
these ways may be either practically or epistemically justified. We might 
have good evidence for trustworthiness of a community in any of these 
senses; or we may find moral or political reasons for extending one or 
more types of trust.
The non-reductive point to be made here is that we need not trust 
others only on the basis of finding in the others that which gives us 
reason to trust ourselves. For example, I  might trust the literature on 
alienation written by marxists to provide a kind of guide to the relevant 
issues and debates, even if I do not accept the major conclusions marxists 
draw from these discussions, reject the main philosophical principles on 
which the analysis is based, and even while I hope to find a better view of 
the issue that is consistent with Islamic traditions of thinking.
Faced with peer disagreement, Zagzebski offers several reasons for 
engaging with other communities: Through such engagement we may 
become aware of errors; presuppositions may come to be recognized; 
reasons may be considered of which one was unaware, or of whose 
significance one was unaware. All of this seems to be beyond dispute. 
What is disputable, however, is the foremost reason that Zagzebski gives 
for engaging with those with whom we disagree, which she describes as 
a rational principle:
Need to Resolve Conflict Principle:
It is a demand of rationality for a community to attempt to resolve 
putative conflicts between its beliefs and the beliefs of other 
communities.23
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While there are a  number of very good reasons for engaging with 
other communities with which we disagree, this Need to resolve Conflict 
Principle is dubious. It is extremely unlikely that our various religious 
communities are ever going to agree on all their religious beliefs. Given 
that we are not going to come to any such agreement, there can be no 
demand of rationality to achieve it.23
In the field of conflict studies, which concerns itself with practical 
social and political conflicts, especially armed conflicts, and not 
logical or epistemological conflicts, the mennonite scholar John Paul 
lederach has developed a  theory of conflict transformation24 whose 
arguments may, with suitable adjustments, be a source for insights in the 
epistemology of disagreement. Just as the parties to a political conflict 
might have good reason to remain steadfast in their commitments to 
their value systems, even when this results in conflict, likewise, given 
that we operate with different doxastic practices that may be fairly 
reliable overall, so that reliance on these practices is epistemically 
justified, rationality cannot demand that the parties to the conflict give 
up their commitments by withholding belief on disputed issues, or by 
accommodation or compromise.
lederach argues that there are cases in which parties to a  social 
conflict are not prepared to withdraw their claims, and they may feel that 
doing so would amount to abandoning legitimate demands. This leads 
to suspicion that attempts at conflict resolution would result in injustice. 
Conflict transformation is proposed as a  strategy for recognizing 
that a  conflict is not going to disappear while transforming it in such 
a manner that it becomes less harmful. likewise, in cases of philosophical 
conflicts of beliefs, it may be that neither side could abandon its basic 
stances without destroying the philosophical doxastic practices each had 
developed. The philosophical conflict may be considered to be harmful 
when each side can do little more than undermine the doxastic practices 
of the other. What the parties to a scientific dispute can do, however, and 
what they are professionally and rationally obliged to do, is to consider the 
arguments and refine their positions in response. As lederach explains, 
a transformational approach allows us to see conflict as an opportunity 
for constructive change. so, the members of one community might 
learn to trust members of another community as conscientious critics 
23 Zagzebski (2012: 224).
24 see lederach (2003).
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and partners in constructive dialogue, even when the partners to the 
dialogue know in advance that fundamental disagreements will remain.
NoN-reDuCTIVe relIGIous ePIsTemoloGY: uNDersTANDING
understanding, like justification, is not merely being in the possession 
of information, but it requires the ability to respond appropriately to 
questions about what is understood, especially when the questions are 
unexpected. understanding a position or a view implies knowing how the 
position or view is to be applied in various circumstances, and knowing 
its strengths and weaknesses. I am concerned with the nonfactive sense of 
understanding, which is the kind of understanding that can occur when 
one understands things that may or may not be true, and about which one 
might not have any belief.25 so, one might understand a proposition, say, 
some formulation of the principle of sufficient reason, or a theory, such 
as Cartesian dualism, without subscribing to them. In Iran, it is often said 
that shahid mutahhari understood marxism better than most marxists.
Nonfactive understanding provides a way of overcoming the logical 
exclusion of contradictory beliefs in the sense that I  can understand 
different positions that are not consistent with one another. Given several 
rival theories that are pairwise inconsistent, I can understand all of them 
while believing in at most one of them.
one can believe with insufficient justification or with insufficient 
understanding. A  tendency to either is an epistemic vice. one who 
tends to believe without sufficient justification is deficient in rationality; 
one who tends to believe without sufficient understanding is deficient 
in wisdom. Wisdom presupposes rationality; but one may be rational 
without being very wise.
both rationality and wisdom come in degrees. beliefs are held more 
rationally when they are better supported by reasons that justify them 
and when there is greater integrity in the worldview of which they are 
a  part. religious views are held with greater wisdom when one has 
a deeper understanding of the creed and religious laws one accepts.
Justification and understanding are both epistemic values, and both of 
them are directed toward truth (even nonfactive understanding). I seek to 
have well justified beliefs in order to avoid error and to raise the likelihood 
that my beliefs will be true. I seek to understand theories, texts, people 
25 For more on factive and nonfactive types of understanding, see elgin (2007), elgin 
(2009), and Kvanvig’s replies to elgin in Haddock et al (2009: 342-343).
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and events in order to avoid making errors about them, coming to have 
false beliefs about them, and in order to arrive at truths related to them. 
If I want to understand marxism, I seek to gain a true understanding of 
this philosophical and social movement, but it is not necessary for me to 
take marxist theory as providing a true account of surplus value or that 
I give any practical allegiance to the social movement.
Despite the shortcomings that understanding without acceptance or 
belief may have, it provides the sole instrument capable of overcoming the 
barriers that arise between two people or two communities that hold non-
negotiable conflicting beliefs. of course, there are other ways to overcome 
barriers, such as personal friendships. However, understanding provides 
the sole rational means to achieving an epistemological appreciation of 
the justifiability of the beliefs of others that are in contradiction with 
our own. Furthermore, even practical means, such as friendship, require 
understanding if they are to achieve cognitive depth.
understanding takes place through dialogue, according to Gadamer. 
The emphasis on dialogue can help us to bring out the contrast between 
justification and understanding. In dialogue for justification, we seek 
to defend our own views and to defeat views that are inconsistent with 
our own by showing that our views have better rational support than 
their rivals. In dialogue for understanding, we seek to explore how 
others think about issues and to reveal to others the ways in which 
we reason about them. In dialogue of justification, we seek to identify 
agreed standards to which appeal can be made in contesting our views. 
In dialogue of understanding, we seek to identify common ground, or 
areas of agreement, in order to provide entry to alien territory. both 
kinds of dialogue involve risk. In dialogue of justification, there is the 
risk of defeat, of losing the debate. In dialogue of understanding, the risk 
is that one will change in ways that are not expected, and perhaps are 
undesired. The changes will involve either or both one’s understanding 
of the other and one’s self-understanding.
one can only engage in the enterprise of seeking understanding 
through dialogue by relying on one’s own epistemic situation, one’s 
relation to intellectual traditions, and one’s presumptions and prejudices. 
one does not arrive at understanding merely by deriving conclusions 
based on presumptions and evidence, however, but by engaging in the 
dialogic practice of seeking and offering reasons and criticisms. one 
of the most prominent themes in Gadamer’s hermeneutics is that the 
particular standpoint or horizon (Horizont) from which one attempts 
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to gain understanding, including one’s prejudices, is not merely a factor 
that limits understanding, but is the means by which understanding is 
gained. Through dialogue, one may seek to gain understanding of another 
person’s religious views; and in the course of this dialogue, one will also 
come to identify one’s own prejudices and reform them when they are 
found to lead to distortions. Hence, in seeking to understand others, we 
must be ready to gain new understanding of ourselves. Although there 
is no escape from one’s horizon, horizons are not static, but change in 
response to dialogue. Gadamer speaks of understanding as a ‘fusion of 
horizons’ (Horizontverschmelzung) or a ‘transposing’ of ourselves.26
Gadamer rejects any analysis of understanding in terms of empathy 
because he considers this to be limited to a first-personal psychological 
phenomenon. In her work on empathy, however, edith stein was 
careful to reject any purely psychological view of empathy.27 For her, the 
problem of empathy was essentially epistemological. stein maintains 
that in empathetic understanding, it is not necessary for one to have 
the feelings one understands in another. she begins with Husserl’s 
recognition of empathy as the basis of all intersubjective experience, and 
explores the conditions that make empathy possible. she considers the 
dialogical nature of empathy as a process through which we may learn to 
understand ourselves as we seek to understand others, while admitting, 
with scheler, that errors may occur in the process leading not only to 
misunderstandings of others but also of the self. our efforts to avoid 
errors in self-understanding and the understanding of others requires us 
to continually shift perspectives from our own first-person standpoint to 
that of how we are perceived by others.28
our task, however, is to attempt to understand the kinds of reasons 
that the followers of other religions have for their beliefs, especially 
when these beliefs logically exclude our own beliefs. For this project, 
considerations of empathy can only provide some clues, for we are 
concerned not so much with feelings but with reasons. At the same time, 
the language employed by Gadamer of the ‘fusion of horizons’ requires 
agreement, while our problem is how to reach understanding when there 
is intractable disagreement. Gadamer does not tell us how horizons can 
be fused when they have non-negotiable contradictory contents.
26 Gadamer (2004: 304); Gadamer (1990: 310).
27 stein (2008: 33-35); stein (1989: 21-22).
28 see macIntyre (2006: 83-85).
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NoN-reDuCTIVe relIGIous ePIsTemoloGY: resoNANCe
If two communities forge their identities with reference to conflicting 
non-negotiable intractable beliefs, must they be unintelligible to one 
another? If their beliefs are justified according to divergent standards and 
doxastic practices, does it become impossible to reach any understanding? 
In this section, I will sketch the optimistic defence of negative answers 
to these questions. The suggestions are presented through the metaphor 
of resonance.
resonance is the opposite of dissonance. The notion of cognitive 
dissonance was introduced in psychology by leon Festinger in the 
1950s, who argued that people use various mechanisms in order to 
avoid or attenuate internal psychological conflicts.29 Festinger’s notion 
of dissonance included conflicts between feelings and beliefs, and not 
merely formal contradictions, and if we are to understand the beliefs of 
others, the emotional associations of the beliefs cannot be overlooked. 
by resonance, however, I do not intend a mere absence of dissonance. In 
ordinary language we say that certain kinds of advertisement resonate 
with customers and motivate them to make purchases. What is meant 
is not merely the removal of psychological obstacles but the arousing of 
a kind of acceptance that the customer feels toward the salesperson or 
the advertising message. The sales pitch is welcomed, both cognitively 
and emotionally.
resonance need not be of the sort at which advertising aims. Acoustic 
resonance can be confined to a limited space. each room is said to have 
its own resonant frequencies. A driving force of a  resonant frequency 
can produce sustained high amplitude oscillations. understanding 
occurs through dialogue when the conversation is able to produce 
sustained exchanges in which the parties to the dialogue are able to 
gain knowledge (or justified beliefs) about the topic of discussion, about 
their dialogue partners, and about themselves. In the process of such 
exchanges, opportunities for developing trust between the participants 
emerge. regardless of the question of justification, resonance is needed 
for understanding. resonance can be emotional or cognitive or both. 
Here I  am concerned with cognitive resonance, or with the cognitive 
aspect of a phenomenon of resonance in which cognitive and emotional 
elements are inseparable.
29 Festinger (1957).
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stein’s discussions of shifting one’s perspective30 may be interpreted 
as special kind of a more general type of phenomenon of compartmen-
talization. We are able to compartmentalize our beliefs so as to have 
good discussions with teachers about the topics they teach, regardless 
of the differences we may have with them about politics or religion. 
The integration of what the student has learned with the rest of the 
student’s network of beliefs and commitments is left to the student. 
Compartmentalization serves as a  tool by means of which we can 
make use of inconsistent beliefs in our reasoning without incoherence: 
Inconsistent beliefs are relativized to their own compartments or 
perspectives. The American philosopher, Wilfrid sellars, proposes this 
sort of strategy in response to the inconsistency he finds between what 
he calls ‘the manifest image’ and ‘the scientific image’. sellars suggests 
that although our ordinary pre-scientific view of the sensible world is 
inconsistent with the picture of the world that modern physics draws for 
us, we can bring the two together, not by immediately forging a ‘synoptic 
vision’, but through the coordination of our intentions.31 exactly how this 
is to be done, and whether it results in a kind of relativism are left unclear 
in sellars’ writings. regardless of how these issues are to be sorted 
out, the strategy of compartmentalization and subsequent attempts at 
a  stereoscopic view may prove practically valuable techniques in the 
pursuit of understanding.
sometimes we gain theoretical expertise without subscribing to the 
theories we learn. one who rejects logical intuitionism may nevertheless 
gain an expertise in intuitionist systems of logic. There have been 
orientalists who have gained a  profound knowledge of Islam without 
becoming muslims. some of these orientalists have gone much further 
than just gathering an enormous amount of information about Islam. 
likewise, I know muslims who have let the beliefs of Christian commu-
nities resonate with them without converting to Christianity or taking 
on an eclectic set of beliefs.
As stein points out, one can empathize with the feeling of joy expressed 
by one’s brother even though one does not have that feeling oneself, but 
one imagines how the brother feels; and this may even happen while 
one’s own feelings are quite contrary to those with which one empathizes. 
so, I might feel annoyed at seeing our mother on a particular occasion, 
30 stein (2008: 80-81); stein (1989: 61-63).
31 see sellars (1971), ch. 1.
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although that does not prevent me from empathizing with my brother’s 
joy at seeing her. something similar can happen at a more intellectual 
level. one may gain an appreciation of how a  marxist thinks about 
religion, even while maintaining that the marxist view of religion is 
fundamentally flawed. I can allow the marxist view to resonate within 
me, without accepting the view as my own. I can learn how marxist views 
on religion fit into the bigger picture of marxist philosophy and politics. 
I can even get to the point of knowing how marxist views on religion 
may develop in the face of new challenges. I can come to appreciate how 
the view fits in marxist doxastic practices.
While justified beliefs are necessary for knowledge, resonance is 
necessary for depth of understanding. Greater cognitive resonance 
makes for deeper understanding. Needless to say, resonance can be 
illusory. We can think that we know exactly how someone thinks about 
an issue, and be able to predict how the person will respond to some 
questions, but yet fail to correctly see how the beliefs in question fit 
into the other’s worldview. so, just as there can be justified beliefs that 
turn out to be false, there can be cognitive resonance that accompanies 
misunderstanding.
A  certain kind of parochialism occurs when we do not allow the 
beliefs of other groups to resonate with us. We refuse to understand them. 
sometimes it is through a wilful stubbornness, but sometimes it is just 
innocent inability. We simply are unable to devote the time and energy 
needed to understand every group that seems to have members who are 
our epistemic peers but with whom we disagree. Part of understanding 
another is knowing what to expect, how they will respond and why. With 
some people, I draw a blank. epistemic resonance is a kind of filling in 
the blank. one learns how the other reasons.
If my rejection of another belief is to have the fullest justification 
possible, and that belief is held by those whom I  take to be epistemic 
peers, I will need to let their beliefs resonate with me before I can be sure 
that there is nothing in the view that I have rejected that would enable 
those who hold it to respond effectively to whatever objections I have to 
it. but achieving maximal justification is not the most important reason 
for seeking to let the beliefs of others resonate. We miss opportunities for 
self-understanding and for understanding others when we are focusing 
exclusively on where we agree and differ in our beliefs, and on debating 
strategies. understanding is to be won through resonance, and not 
39resPoNDING To THe relIGIous reAsoNs oF oTHers
merely by the elimination of conflicting beliefs. Indeed, in the absence of 
resonance misunderstanding can persist despite agreement.
In order for there to be successful resonance with a view, one must 
learn to navigate the space of reasons in the manner of those who are 
one’s epistemic peers and who hold the view, that is, one must learn how 
they would judge cases and apply their view to various kinds of dialogue. 
one must learn what sorts of questions to ask, and how to respond to 
the questions and objections of others. This is not a matter of sharing 
feelings or beliefs. Navigational skills in foreign intellectual waters 
cannot be achieved by even the most sensitive kinds of empathy, for one 
can empathize with another’s religious commitment, but be completely 
at a loss with regard to the other’s theological position.
There are various strategies that might be employed in order to 
achieve cognitive resonance with the views of a group whose beliefs one 
does not share. First, one can imagine that one holds other beliefs. even 
though I am not a Calvinist, for example, I can learn about Calvinism 
and use my powers of imagination to envision myself as a  Calvinist. 
one can engage in various kinds of fictionalist strategies for the purpose 
of gaining understanding. Here, I will mention only two. First, I could 
pretend to be a  Calvinist, but not to deceive anyone. I  could tell my 
Calvinist friends that I was going to pretend to be a Calvinist in order to 
get to understand their theology so that I could pass an exam in religious 
studies, for instance. second, I  could suppress my true beliefs though 
a  kind of mentalis restrictio or mental reservation. mental reservation 
was a way to mitigate lying in situations in which the lie was justified 
by mentally adding words to what is spoken aloud so that the complete 
statement would be true, although what is heard would be untrue. As 
a strategy for resonance, the purpose is not to deceive, but to learn to 
reason as others do, when the others’ reasoning is based on premises 
one rejects. so, instead of pretending to believe as Calvinists do, when 
I want to try to reason along with Calvinists, I could mentally preface my 
claims with ‘If I were a Calvinist, I would believe that ...’ or some such 
conditional.
An important technique for learning to resonate with views that 
conflict with our own is to begin with beliefs that we share with the others 
whom we seek to understand. The shared beliefs can serve as a basis from 
which we can begin to develop an appreciation of how another view may 
be imagined with its own integrity, different from one’s own, yet sharing 
significant beliefs. once a set of common or shared beliefs is identified, 
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the process of learning to resonate with the beliefs of others can take 
various forms. At one extreme, one can put aside or bracket one’s own 
beliefs that fall outside the common set, and try to imagine how that set 
could be expanded in a reasonable way to yield the complete belief set of 
one’s dialogue partner. Call this strategy bracketing. At the other extreme, 
one might attempt to attribute as many of one’s own beliefs to the dialogue 
partner as possible and revise one’s view of the partner only as needed 
to maintain integrity. Call this strategy projection and revision. either 
of these methods, or a  combination of them, is employed in ordinary 
conditions of attempting to learn about a view that we are not prepared 
to accept. Thus, if I want to learn to understand intuitionist logic, I will 
first identify the kinds of inference and axioms that intuitionist logic 
shares with the standard logic that I accept. Next, I will try to learn how 
the exclusively intuitionist beliefs can make sense in terms of the shared 
beliefs to form a consistent belief set. To gain a deeper understanding of 
how new forms of intuitionist logic may be developed, I will either draw 
upon my own previous beliefs to the extent that they can be adapted to 
the intuitionist views, or I will ignore my own previous beliefs and try 
to find other forms of intuitionist reasoning solely on the basis of what 
I have learned about intuitionism.
using the bracketing strategy, I might imagine myself as an intuitionist, 
either through pretending or by mental reservation. using the projection 
and revision strategy, I  could imagine what it would take for me to 
actually become an intuitionist, how I could integrate intuitionist beliefs 
into my own belief set.
This process of learning to resonate with the views of another can 
achieve any of various degrees of success. In some cases, the success may 
be minimal. We may find ourselves to be incapable of understanding the 
other’s view. I would not attempt to defend the view that resonance with 
views that we do not accept is necessary in order to be justified in rejecting 
them, although the highest degree of justification for the rejection of at 
least some views will require the kind of deep understanding of them 
that occurs when one allows oneself to resonate with them. Furthermore, 
in order to engage in dialogue with others whose beliefs I reject in a way 
that is conducive to mutual understanding, resonance will be necessary. 
by allowing resonance and deepening it, I can find truth, even in views 
that I reject – not that I will accept the view I reject as true, but I may find 
that the view includes truths in addition to the beliefs I consider to be 
incorrect. more importantly, by learning to use alien doxastic practices, 
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I may find ways in which to integrate aspects of these practices in my 
own in a coherent and fruitful manner.
NoN-reDuCTIVe relIGIous ePIsTemoloGY: 
sCrIPTurAl reAsoNING
In the early 1990s, scholars of modern Jewish philosophy and rabbinic 
texts began to meet together to develop an interdisciplinary approach to 
key questions about Judaism. The academic meetings that were held and 
their university forums, as well as the practice of study that evolved, came 
to be known as Textual reasoning. In the mid-1990s, some Christian 
colleagues were invited to observe, and they suggested that the practice 
could serve as a  model for interfaith dialogue. later, muslim scholars 
were also invited, and the result was dubbed ‘scriptural reasoning’ by 
rabbi Peter ochs.32 The movement (commonly referred to as ‘sr’) has 
since sprouted various branches and ochs also has founded an academic 
journal with the same name.33 scriptural reasoning is a practice guided 
by views of mutual respect and the desire to understand others that 
resonates with non-reductive religious pluralism, particularly with regard 
to epistemological concerns, including the recognition of intractable 
differences and the promotion of wisdom and depth of understanding 
by learning how religious believers undertake the practices of reasoning 
about and on the basis of their scriptures in their own ways.
other forms of dialogue continue to take place that focus on theology 
or philosophy instead of scripture, but that share in much of the non-
reductive ethos of mutual respect and efforts to gain wisdom through the 
deeper understanding of the views of others. most of these encounters 
have been between the adherents of different faith communities; but, 
in principle the general aims of mutual understanding and wisdom 
through the respectful attempt to learn the doxastic practices others use 
when they reason could be applied to groups and individuals beyond the 
Abrahamic tent.
In an interview in Qom, Ayatullah Ka‘bi,34 has interpreted the 
following verse of the Qur’an in an inclusive way. The verse specifically 
mentions the People of the Book, but the principle is more general: 
32 For an account of the origins of scriptural reasoning, see Ford (2006).
33 The Journal of Scriptural Reasoning, available at: <etext.virginia.edu/journals/ssr/>.
34 Abbas Ka‘bi Nasab is a  former member of the Guardian Council of the Islamic 
republic of Iran. He currently holds a seat in the Assembly of experts.
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muslims are enjoined to find shared beliefs on the basis of which they 
can enter into dialogue with others.
say: ‘o People of the book! Come to a common word between us and 
you, that we worship none but Allah, and that we associate no partners 
with Him, and that none of us shall take from among ourselves lords 
aside from Allah.’ Then, if they turn away, say: ‘bear witness that we are 
muslims.’ (3:64)
We are not to engage with others for the sake of disputing with them, but 
for dialogue. The shared basis from which we can begin dialogue with 
other monotheists is a commitment to the principles mentioned in the 
verse. If we are to engage with non-monotheistic dialogue partners, we 
should follow the same procedure of inviting them to participate with 
us in dialogue on the basis of shared commitments, which might be, 
for example, to strive for justice and the alleviation of oppression. It is 
important to notice that the ‘common word’ is only what serves for the 
invitation and initiation of dialogue.
For the shī‘ah, the need to engage with others on the basis of their 
own scriptures is found in narrations from the first and the last of the 
twelve Imams. It is reported that Imam ‘Alī (ع)35 publicly stated:
[by Allah!]36 If I were given the cushion [the seat of judgment],37 I would 
judge between the people of the Torah by their Torah, and between the 
people of the Gospel by their Gospel and between the people of the 
Qur’an by their Qur’an.38
In another narration, it is reported that Imam ‘Alī (ع) said:
If I were given the cushion [the seat of judgment], I would judge between 
the people of the Qur’an by the Qur’an so that it would glisten for Allah 
[or radiate to Allah], between the people of the Torah by the Torah so 
that it would glisten for Allah, between the people of the Gospel by the 
Gospel so that it would glisten for Allah, and between the people of the 
Psalms according to the Psalms so that it would glisten for Allah.39
35 The shi‘ah abbreviate the Arabic for ‘peace be with him’ after mentioning the Imams 
and certain other sacred figures by using the letter: ع.
36 This phrase is omitted in some reports.
37 literally: ‘If the cushion were unfolded for me.’ The phrase is used to mean being 
provided with executive/judicial authority.
38 al-Hilālī (2002: Vol. 2, 803), hadith 32; also muntazir Qā’im (2005: 204-205).
39 al-safār al-Qummi (1984: 132). In this collection there is an entire chapter 
consisting of nine narrations similar to this, which is the first of them.
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The narrations similar to these are so numerous that the shi‘ah consider 
the claim that Imam ‘Alī (ع) said words to this effect, and most likely 
on more than one occasion, to be mutawātir, that is, it is considered 
inconceivable that the content of the narration is untrue.
These reports are an important endorsement of the non-reductive 
perspective for three reasons. First, Imam ‘Alī (ع) claims that he 
would reason on the basis of the different scriptures, so that there is 
the engagement in reasoning to offer judgment based on each of the 
scriptures of the religious communities. second, he is not to reason on 
the basis only of what is in agreement with the Qur’an, but on the basis 
of their Torah and their Gospel, that is, on the basis of the scriptures as 
accepted by their own communities of followers. Third, the fulfilment, 
blossoming, or radiant glistening of the scriptures is found through his 
recourse to them to issue judgments among their followers. According 
to the non-reductive epistemological pluralism I have sought to outline 
here, the following three corresponding points are to be noted: First, 
we are to seek understanding with others by learning to engage in their 
doxastic practices; second, we are not to attempt to reduce the views of 
others only to what we hold in common with them; and, third, each of 
the commitments of the faith communities to their scriptures may be 
found pleasing to God, without any need to claim that divine judgment 
is indifferent to their points of conflict.
These points receive further support in shi‘i theology on the basis of 
another set of narrations according to which the Twelfth Imam (ع) will 
judge between the people of the various scriptures by their scriptures 
when he emerges from occultation.40
The doxastic practices of Jews, Christians, and muslims include 
reference to scriptural authority. It is only with respectful regard to 
and resonance with the cognitive frameworks that arise from these 
practices and others that we can think of one another as sharing in 
the understanding and wisdom that make meaningful dialogue and 
rationality itself possible among us. We do not enter into dialogue with 
more than a little trust, which we can only pray will blossom and bear 
fruit if properly cultivated. our doxastic practices neither need to be 
compromised by adapting to one another nor do they need to be boiled 
down to an empty formalism that could be abstracted from all of them; 
rather we require them to be reconciled by joining them together through 
40 e.g., al-Nu‘mānī (2003: 323-324).
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the practical knowledge of how they enable us to reason with members 
of our own communities and others.41, 42
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